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ARTICLE
Truth after post-truth: for a Strong Programme in
Discourse Studies
Johannes Angermuller1
ABSTRACT Contemporary post-truth discourses put the constructivist foundations of
Discourse Studies to a test. According to critical observers, discourse analysts have been
playing into the hands of Trump, Brexit and right-wing populists by politicising scientiﬁc
knowledge and undermining the idea of scientiﬁc truth. In order to respond to these concerns,
this article outlines a Strong Programme in Discourse Studies. While the Strong Programme
insists on truths as discursive constructions, in no way does it claim that all ideas have the
same truth value or that an idea can become true because somebody wants it to be true. The
Strong Programme makes the case for discourse research that is constructivist (it asks how
truths are constructed practically) without being relativist (all ideas do not have the same
normative quality). Taking inspiration from debates in Science and Technology Studies of the
1970s, the Strong Programme formulates principles for discourse researchers dealing with
conﬂicting truth claims. Discourse analytical explanations of truths of ﬁrst-order participants
and of second-order observers should be symmetrical, heterogeneous, multi-perspectival and
reﬂexive. The Strong Programme discourse research is grounded in the founding traditions of
“French” and “Critical” Discourse Studies, which have struggled over questions of truth and
reality since the beginning. While critically interrogating the structuralist heritage of these
strands, the Strong Programme insists on the practices of making and unmaking ideas
through language use no matter whether they appear as true or false to participants and
observers. Discourse Studies are encouraged to critically reﬂect on how hierarchies between
knowledges are not only represented but, through their representation, also constituted
through discursive practices.
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Introduction: truth in the age of post-truth
Generations of discourse researchers have engaged in cri-tical reﬂections on truth as a weapon of the powerful.From Nietzsche’s idea of truth as “a mobile army of
metaphors” (Nietzsche, 1997, p 880) to Foucault’s investigations
of the nexus of truth, subjectivity and discourse (Foucault, 2017),
many have pledged to deconstruct ‘Western’ claims to objective
and universal truth. Yet if truth is nothing more than a product of
discursive struggles, would one not have to accept all ideas as
equally true? And how do discourse researchers defend the truth
claims of their own research vis-à-vis the discourses they criticise?
According to critics, discourse theorists have gone too far in
questioning reality since the advent of mass media society (e.g.,
Flyverbom and Reinecke, 2017). Thus, observers from within
Discourse Studies, as well as from outside have denounced French
discourse theories as ‘postmodernist’ (Habermas, 1993; Eagleton,
1996), even as a threat to Western democracy (Ferry and Renaut,
1988). Thus, for these critics, ‘postmodernism’ supports the idea
that anything goes in moral affairs, that truth is nothing but an
expression of power relationships and that an idea is true because
people want it to be true. And they blame postmodernists for
discrediting the idea of scientiﬁc truth.
One recalls the scathing attacks against French discourse the-
ory and Science and Technology Studies during the Sokal affair,
which erupted in 1996, when a nonsense article on quantum
physics was accepted for publication in Social Text, a Cultural
Studies journal from North America, known for its ‘post-
modernist’ inclinations. Alan Sokal, the physics professor who
authored the article, blamed discourse theorists for a perceived
lack of intellectual rigour and warned against politicising the
knowledge produced by the natural sciences (Sokal and Bricmont,
1998).
Now that populist leaders such as Trump reject scientiﬁcally
established facts like climate change, STS scholars and discourse
researchers once again need to defend constructivist approaches
to scientiﬁc knowledge. How do they respond to those unlikely
‘friends’ in the political arena who, like Brexit champion Michael
Gove, claim to “have had enough of experts” (3rd of June 2016 on
Sky News) and who, like Kellyanne Conway (22nd of January
2017 on NBC), justiﬁed Donald Trump’s claims about his inau-
guration as “alternative facts”? How can discourse researchers go
on with critically interrogating truth and reality if their research
may serve propagandists of post-truth and their ideological
agenda?
Some liberal commentators from the media sphere have traced
populist aberrations back to French discourse theory, for instance
Guardian columnist Matthew d’Ancona (2017, chapter 4), Casey
Williams in the New York Times (2017) or social media activist
Helen Pluckrose (2017). But why are theorists such as Foucault
and Derrida, who worked in France in the 1960s and 1970s and
never made speciﬁc claims about contemporary politics in the U.
S. or the UK, held responsible for political problems today? The
attacks against discourse theory are even more surprising given
that the young urban intellectuals who like to refer to discourse
theory today generally have no sympathy whatsoever with the
ideological agenda of right-wing populists.
Yet whatever the seriously ﬂawed arguments that some jour-
nalists throw against academics and intellectuals, I ﬁnd it legit-
imate to ask whether right-wing populists, who tend to reject
science and scientiﬁc reason that does not serve their agenda, are
emboldened by constructivist critiques of truth that one can ﬁnd
among poststructuralists and postmodernists, in STS scholars and
discourse theorists. While constructivism has been the object of a
long critical debate (Hacking, 1999), leaving the question of truth
to philosophers and political theorists would be a mistake. Dis-
course researchers should be attentive to the questions of
philosophers such as Arendt (2006), Habermas (1990) or Ran-
cière (1995). One may not share their predisposition for abstract,
acontextual and universalist thinking. Yet discourse researchers
should consider that all truth claims have the same value. Nor are
ideas true if they are accepted by a majority.
Discourse researchers can subscribe to the idea that there
are discursive struggles over truth but not all truth claims
have the same normative quality. There are claims about realities,
which may become true through the force of large social
groups (think of the dynamics of mass media discourse)
in the exchanges between few select specialists (e.g., small aca-
demic and professional communities). Some truth claims are
about social realities, others about non-social realities. And
often there is a conﬂict between different types of truth claims
emerging in games mobilising different resources and following
different rules.
While discourse is a practice mobilising linguistic, as well as
non-linguistic resources, truth claims are made in and about the
material world. Discourse theorists have been interested in how
social and cultural phenomena are turned into ‘matter’ through
discursive practices (Butler, 1993). Discourse theorists can agree
with theorists of the New Materialism that there are no one-way
causal relationships between discursive practices and non-
discursive matter (Frost, 2011). Humans do not have a mono-
poly of knowledge and agency over a material world seen as a
passive surface waiting to be shaped by human inscriptions
(Barad, 2003). Discourse researchers should have no problem
with recognizing the social and non-social constraints on the
representations people make of reality. A lake is not frozen
because people say it is frozen and people feel hungry no matter
what is said about their bodies. Discourse communities may
indeed accept the idea as true and real that the lake is frozen and
that you are not hungry even though the lake is not frozen and
you are hungry.
While discourse researchers should accept that there is a world
which is beyond discursive reach (physics, biology etc. are not
merely social constructions as STS scholars have always reminded
us, Vrieze, 2017), it would be problematical to understand
whatever happens between language users in terms of physical,
biological or other such non-discursive laws. At the same time,
the social world is a heterogeneous space of articulated elements,
things, practices, bodies, which should not be reduced to one all-
encompassing power game which explains it all. Therefore, what
one can take from both political philosophers and the theorists of
the New Materialism is that claims gain speciﬁc truth values in a
heterogeneity of practical expertise that constitute the speciﬁc
normative quality of a truth claim.
To counter the politics of post-truth, discourse researchers,
therefore, do not have to return to Truth—i.e., to the assumption
that some ideas are inherently better than others, that only
trained specialists can have access to them, that some ideas are
true before and outside discourse as it were. Discourse researchers
can distinguish between truth claims with higher and lower
normative quality without betraying their fundamental con-
structivist orientations. Hence, in the following, I will outline a
Strong Programme that makes the case for discourse research
which is constructivist without being relativist. It formulates
principles that allow discourse researchers to deal with truth
claims of ﬁrst-order participants and second-order observers.
While the Strong Programme pleads for symmetrical explana-
tions of true and false knowledges, it recognizes that not all
knowledges are equal. Some knowledges have more truth value
than others. Yet all truths are entangled in social dynamics and
political struggles as a result of which not everything is accepted
as equally true and valuable knowledge.
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I will start with a discussion of two major traditions in Dis-
course Studies, namely “French school” discourse analysis and
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Both these traditions are
struggling with the heritage of structuralism, which sometimes
leads them to adopt asymmetric (i.e., ‘weak’) explanations of true
and false discourses. I will then look into debates in Science and
Technology Studies over the social nature of scientiﬁc knowledge.
In this debate, political and epistemological questions over the
authority of the observers were raised similar to those discourse
researchers and social researchers are struggling with today. I will
conclude with the observation that a ‘strong’ epistemology
(constructivism) does not imply a ‘weak’ politics—i.e., science
pretending to be neutral or unable to take political positions.
Whenever language users enter discourse, they participate in
struggles over truth, which cannot but be political.
Classical discourse studies: from the crisis of Truth to the
many truths
Discourse Studies is a recent ﬁeld, which has resulted from the
encounter of two lines of debate: discourse theory and discourse
analysis. Discourse theory deals with questions in social, political
and cultural theory around the role of language and commu-
nication in contemporary society (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985;
Foucault, 1969; Butler, 1997). Also labelled as ‘linguistic turn’ in
post-war philosophy (from Heidegger to Foucault and Habermas)
or French Theory in the cultural and literary ﬁeld, discourse
theory concentrates on epistemological questions such as the
limits of the speaking subject (Derrida, 1967), the dilemmas of
representation in postmodernity (Jameson, 1991) or the dis-
cursive negotiation of normative claims (Habermas, 1981). While
discourse theory shows a proclivity for philosophical and episte-
mological problems, discourse analysis puts emphasis on analy-
tical methods that discourse researchers use to investigate social
practices in view of producing insights into empirical objects
(Angermuller et al., 2014). If discourse theory points to the
intellectual challenges in Discourse Studies, discourse analysis
reminds us of the crucial role of analytical models and empirical
methods in Discourse Studies.
Whenever the theorists met the analysts turned out to be
particularly productive (Angermuller, 2015). And two such
moments have given birth to brands in Discourse Studies which
are recognised internationally today: “French” Discourse Studies,
which goes back to debates around Marxism, structuralism and
psychoanalysis in France in the late 1960s, and “Critical” Dis-
course Studies, which has become prominent since the late 1980s
in the Anglophone world.
The two labels may be somewhat misleading in that “French”
discourse researchers usually see themselves as “critical” claiming
a background in Marxist social theory. And some “critical” dis-
course researchers cite “French” discourse theorists (who are not
necessarily French or even French-speaking natives if one
includes the many commentators of Foucault et al. outside
France). It needs emphasising that Critical Discourse Studies is
not more “critical” than French Discourse Studies, both being
rooted in Marxism and involving academics with a strong
engagement in civil society (Dufour, 2013). What is more, even
though the “French” school of discourse analysis, which one can
trace back to a group of linguists around Michel Pêcheux, is a
largely French-speaking phenomenon, it comprises scholars in
many other countries, especially from the “Latin” world (Latin
America, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Romania…). And the geo-
graphical base of “Critical” Discourse Analysis may not be too
obvious, either. While centred in the UK, it is especially popular
among a large community of English-speaking discourse
researchers.
“French” Discourse Studies goes back to a ﬁrst conjuncture of
discourse theory and discourse analysis, of discourse theorists
such as Michel Pêcheux and Michel Foucault (Foucault, 1969;
Pêcheux, 1969) and the discourse analytical tools from linguistics,
including corpus analysis (lexicométrie), distributionalism and
pragmatics, most of which are less known outside France than
French discourse theories, which have been translated into many
languages. While Foucault made the label of discourse known
across the disciplines and internationally, it was Michel Pêcheux,
who established ‘discourse’ in linguistics by founding what is
sometimes called the ‘French’ school of discourse analysis.
Pêcheux and his collaborators emphasise the need for a linguistic
analysis that accounts for the ‘materiality’ of language (Conein
et al., 1981). In this view, language is not like a window to the
external world or to an internal consciousness. It is perceived as a
surface of opaque signs whose constraints on interpretive activ-
ities need to be decrypted.
The stance of ‘French’ discourse analysts is ‘materialist’ in at
least two ways (cf. Beetz, 2017). For one thing, it rejects the
spontaneous interpretive practices of hermeneutics and relies on
rigorous formal analysis of material linguistic forms. For another,
it articulates linguistic analysis of discourse with ‘materialist’
social theory. Thus, Pêcheux takes inspiration from Althusserian
Marxism as discursive formations are embedded in their material
‘conditions of production’, i.e., class struggle. Pêcheux’s materi-
alist programme was basically shared by Foucault even though in
a less radical way. Foucault’s discourse analytical work is not
Marxist even though he showed a keen, critical sense of the power
relationships in which language use is inevitably bound up with.
In his Archaeology of Knowledge, he resolutely goes beyond the
abstract formalism of linguistic structuralism while referring
linguistic practice to its sociohistorical context (Angermuller,
2014, 7ff.).
In France, such research has succeeded in establishing ‘dis-
course’ both as a transdisciplinary problem (‘discourse’ as a
recognised theoretical problem across the social sciences and
humanities – ‘French discourse theory’) and as an object of a
subdisciplinary ﬁeld (i.e., discourse analysis as a specialized
research practice within linguistics – ‘French discourse analysis’).
Outside France, French discourse theory, often inspired by
translations of Foucault’s critical work, has become popular in the
literary and cultural ﬁeld and among many Anglophone and
German-language social and political theorists. Within France,
discourse analysis has seen a decisive move toward pragmatic
questions while focusing on societal institutions (Maingueneau,
2014).
The other major international brand is Critical Discourse
Studies, which began in the UK and in countries of the Com-
monwealth (van Leeuwen, 2008), in the German-speaking world
(Wodak et al., 1998) and through Teun van Dijk’s work also in
the Latin world (van Dijk, 1985). Just as French Discourse Stu-
dies, Critical Discourse Studies has its base in linguistics and it
has developed many links to other ﬁelds such as sociology, his-
tory, political science, education, psychology, anthropology, phi-
losophy (cf. Unger, 2016). Critical Discourse Studies is an
umbrella label for a broad range of theories and methods at the
intersection of language and society. While French Discourse
Studies is inspired by Continental theoretical strands like struc-
turalism, Marxism and psychoanalysis, Critical Discourse Studies
is more eclectic in its theoretical orientations and is sometimes
inﬂuenced by Halliday’s systemic-functional linguistics. "Critical"
discourse researchers are often driven by humanist concerns over
social injustices with the explicit desire to respond to social
problems and to bring about positive social change. Therefore,
almost any discourse analytical methods and tools can be and are
used within Critical Discourse Studies, including quantitative
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corpus analysis and the whole array of qualitative methods of
social research, e.g., document analysis, interactional approaches
or ethnography.
Whereas Pêcheux and Foucault are two major theoretical
reference points in French Discourse Analysis, one may see the
systemic-functional linguistics of MKA Halliday (1978) and Basil
Bernstein’s sociology of education (1971) perhaps as majors
inspirations of CDA theorists. Halliday’s theoretical project is
centred on the semiotic resources that allows language users to
realise the functions of language (such as the ideational, inter-
personal and textual ones). Emphasis is put on the social contexts
in which the meaning potentials of semiotic resources are rea-
lised. Halliday worked in close collaboration with Bernstein, who
studied the role of language among pupils from lower and upper
classes in Great Britain. Even though Bernstein’s distinction
between the restricted code of working-class pupils and the ela-
borate code of upper-class pupils has always caused controversial
reactions, his inﬂuence on the way many British linguists con-
ceptualised the nexus of language and society should not be
underestimated.1
Since the 1980s, the label CDA has come to designate
language-related research on social problems, more speciﬁcally to
research on how inequalities between large social groups
(including relations of race, class and gender) shape and are
shaped by the use of language in larger communities. Fairclough’s
social context model (1992, p 73) is an instructive example of how
the functionalist (Hallidayan) approach to language is articulated
with a macrosociological (Bernsteinian) perspective on the social.
It puts the text (i.e., oral and written manifestations of language)
centre stage. The text is surrounded by the context in two circles
as it were, a ﬁrst circle comprising processes of meaning nego-
tiation between the discourse participants (“interaction”) and a
second circle designating society’s institutional structures (“con-
text”). Fairclough, therefore, testiﬁes to a structuralist under-
standing of the social context in which language is used. Language
use is embedded within the constituted structures of society. As a
consequence, the social is posited as the hard ground of reality to
which linguistic activity (“text”+ “interaction”) relates. A similar
tendency of taking the social as a given rather than as the
empirical problem can be observed among other representatives
of Critical Discourse Studies. Van Dijk’s sociocognitive approach
(2008) asks how cognition mediates between language and
society. Society is perceived as the mute outside of linguistically
organised cognition. Wodak and Reisigl, Wodak (2009), too,
deﬁne Critical Discourse Studies as linguistic research that
focuses on such given social problems. Accordingly, rather than
examining how discourse participants negotiate what counts as a
social problem, Wodak and Reisigl start from a social problem
and assess how language use relates to the problem thus stated.
Discourse researchers from both the French and Critical tra-
ditions have been crucially interested in how truths are produced
and established through language use in discourse communities
(e.g., Guilbert, 2008; Reisigl, 2008).2 Yet one can observe that they
tend to apply different accounts to the two types of social realities
they deal with, namely to the social reality of the ﬁrst-order
participants (SR 1) and to the social reality of the second-order
observers and discourse researchers (SR2). Why is such an
asymmetry problematical?
It is a common question in Discourse Studies to ask how
discursive practices, i.e., the social uses made of language, not
only represent SR 1 but, through its representation, also con-
stitute SR 1. A classic example is how social problems (SR 1) are
constructed in public discourse (cf. Miró, 2017; Pechtelidis and
Stamou, 2017). Yet, to account for the construction of SR 1,
discourse researchers typically investigate how language is used in
its social and historical contexts, which one may designate as SR
2: the communities, the institutions, the economic resources
which are mobilised in discursive practices. The question is how
to deal with contradictions between SR 1 and SR 2, which critical
research often provoke. SR 1 may be false from the researcher’s
point of view, i.e., a mere opinion that the participants of a dis-
course have accepted as true. SR 2, by contrast, is the idea the
researcher has about the social context, which she or he holds as
true. While SR 1 may be a result of systematic discourse analytical
investigation, SR 2 often refers to the theoretical framework or
background knowledge the researcher assumes to be true. In
other words, how does one deal with the problem that the social
reality that Trump accepts (SR 1) will normally not accept the
reality that discourse researchers presuppose in order to account
for Trump (SR 2)?
Discourse researchers usually make truth claims about SR 1
and SR 2, which is precisely what they are supposed to do. What
needs to be problematized, however, is a tendency to account for
SR 1 and SR 1 differently: namely SR 1 as a discursively con-
structed reality (which therefore may be ‘false’) and SR 2 as a
reality which is not constructed in discourse (which therefore
cannot be false). Such an asymmetric account is weak episte-
mologically speaking for why could not SR 2 be challenged with
the same arguments that are used to deconstruct SR 1? And it
may not constitute a strong political position either if it invites
post-truth propagandists to simply turn the table and place sci-
ence, the media and the ‘establishment’ in the position of SR 1. SR
1 is then revealed to be a discursive construction from the point
of view of SR 2, i.e., the world of America First and Brexit Britain.
‘French’ and ‘Critical’ discourse research, indebted to the
heritage of structuralism, often struggles with such inbuilt
asymmetries between the truth claims of ﬁrst-order discourse
participants and the truth claims of second-order observers. Such
asymmetries have been a problem that ‘poststructuralist’ devel-
opments have tried to solve by rejecting any primacy of SR 2 over
SR 1. It has indeed become difﬁcult for post-Weberian social
scientists to claim a god’s eye view in face of the many competing
truths in society.
While the social sciences have seen a turn towards the actor
during the 20th century, the actor is mostly seen with suspicion in
both Critical and French Discourse Studies, and with good rea-
sons! Throughout the 1970s, Pêcheux and his collaborators held
out against attempts to take pragmatic lessons and bring the actor
back in, which they perceived as preparing the ground for a
return to an insipid humanism (at best) and even to bourgeois
liberalism (at worst). A similar tendency can be observed in the
Anglophone and German-speaking world where critical discourse
analysts were long pitted against conversation analysts as can be
seen in the controversy between Billig (1999) and Schegloff
(1997). For Schegloff, Critical Discourse Analysis relies on
external theories of context, i.e., on ideas and theories the critical
discourse analyst has about social inequality rather than on the
knowledge the discourse participants ﬂag out as relevant. Con-
versation analysts in turn have been suspected for not taking
power and inequality into account and for seeing society as a
mere illusion of left-leaning ideologues.
While these clashes, it seems, have pushed both discourse and
conversation analysts back into their respective specialised niches,
with a structuralist account of Truth for discourse researchers and
a pragmatist account of a plurality of truths for conversation
analysts, such an opposition is neither necessary nor productive
(cf. Taha, 2017). Yet upon closer inspection, Schegloff’s argument
was meant to be a methodological, not an ontological one. Lan-
guage use refers to speciﬁc practices of making some context
relevant, i.e., to contextualisation as an ongoing activity of par-
ticipants in discourse where nobody can claim to grasp ‘the’
context as such and thus take a position of Truth (cf. Porsché,
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2018). What Schegloff challenges is the idea that discourse ana-
lysts can see society from a privileged viewpoint which is more
objective than the ones other discourse participants take. The
conﬂict between discourse and conversation analysts, therefore,
prolongs struggles over who has the true expertise and authority
to make true and legitimate claims about the social: the con-
versation analyst typically privileges the expertise of the actors
(and perceives their truths on the same par as his or her truths)
whereas the discourse analyst takes aims to reveal what the par-
ticipants cannot see (which places her or him in a position of
Truth). The danger for discourse researchers is to claim an
absolutist epistemological position concerning the social.
To deal with this problem, French and critical traditions have
been switching uneasily between two arguments which are difﬁ-
cult to reconcile. On the one hand, they like to see discourse as
being constitutive of the social: discursive practices do not only
represent the social. Rather, through representation, such prac-
tices bring forth the relationships and structures that make up the
social. On the other hand, discourse researchers usually place
discursive practices within constituted conﬁgurations of power
and inequality, which are not ‘just’ discursive constructions. As a
way out, I will invite discourse researchers to consider the Strong
Programme, which conceives discourse as a situated practice of
making and unmaking truths through the uses members make of
language in a discourse community. The Strong Programme
rejects philosophical accounts of Truth in favour of reﬂexive
investigations of struggles over truths.
Towards the Strong Programme in Science and Technology
Studies
At this point we will need to look into the lessons that discourse
researchers can draw from Science and Technology Studies
(STS).3 The Strong Programme was formulated in STS in the
1970s, when the ideal of science as pure knowledge production
came under attack. While earlier sociologists of science still clung
to the idea that there was Truth out there, untouched by society
as it were, which scientists could reveal under certain circum-
stances, a new generation of more radically constructivist scholars
in STS felt that all scientiﬁc knowledge needed to be seen as a
product of social, political and economic dynamics. Commonly
associated with a group of philosophers and sociologists based at
Edinburgh under the leadership of David Bloor, the Strong
Programme emerged from the critical interrogations over the
social nature of scientiﬁc truth.
Bloor’s objective was to formulate basic epistemological prin-
ciples which allow scientists to reﬂect on the truth claims made by
others in relationship to their own truth claims. Bloor (1991, p 3)
argued that contemporary sociologists of knowledge and science
betrayed their discipline if they followed an implicit hierarchy–or
‘asymmetry’–between ‘true’ scientiﬁc knowledge, which is true on
its own account and needs no sociological explanation, and ‘false’
knowledge, which is in need of a sociological explanation.
For Bloor, ‘true’, as well as ‘false’ knowledges result from the
interplay of social, as well as an array of other (‘material’) factors.
Hence, the Strong Programme explicitly acknowledges that truth
and reality may be made not only from social practices. In a
similar vein, the Strong Programme will invite discourse
researchers today to apply discourse analytical insights symme-
trically to both ‘true’ and ‘false’ assumptions about social reality.
Strong programmers investigate the discursive practices, pro-
cesses and mechanisms of constructing social order. But they do
not claim that what is real and true in such constructions is a
function of discursive practices only. Reality and truth are built
from social stuff which can be discursive (involving language) or
non-discursive (non-linguistic actions) and also from non-social
stuff (which can be human bodies or non-human matter). The
reality of the social conceals no inherent rationality that would
entail a given, ‘objective’ way of describing it through discourse.
Nor does it come with universal values which would demand a
‘just’ judgement. Strong programmers take into account whatever
can help explain the making of truth and reality. They are
materialists after all.
In his Knowledge and Social Imagery (1991, 5ff.), Bloor lays out
the four principles that sum up the Strong Programme in the
sociology of scientiﬁc knowledge:
1. Causality. Rather than supporting the causalistic logic of the
natural sciences, Bloor points to the speciﬁc conditions and
causes, which can include non-social ones “which will
cooperate in bringing about belief” (1991, p 7).
2. Impartiality. Bloor rejects the idea of there being a priori
hierarchies between knowledges. While Bloor abstains from
privileging truth over falsity, rationality over irrationality,
success over failure, one may take such hierarchies as the
object to be accounted for.
3. Symmetry. Explanations would need to identify the same
types of cause to “explain say, true and false beliefs”. Truth,
in other words, would not be something to be explained
philosophically and untruth to be explained sociologically.
4. Reﬂexivity. The sociology of scientiﬁc knowledge, too, is
involved in the production of truths and untruths. Therefore,
explanations would also need to be applicable to the
knowledge claims of the Strong Programme: “It is an obvious
requirement of principle because otherwise sociology would
be a standing refutation of its own theories.” (1991, p 7),
The Strong Programme has been widely received as the theo-
retical symptom of a practice turn in the sociological and his-
torical research on science in the 1970s and 1980s. The implicit
adversary was rationalistic and positivistic ideas of science as pure
knowledge, as well as the classical (‘institutionalist’) sociology of
science, going back to Merton (1968). Bloor and his associates
perceived Merton to be tacitly indebted to a rationalist agenda.
While Merton insisted on the sociocultural foundations (the
‘scientiﬁc ethos’) of the science system, his work aims at identi-
fying the social conditions that are needed for true knowledge to
emerge. In terms of the conditions that ‘real’ science needs,
Merton sees Western liberal democracies, especially the USA
during the 20th century, as superior to Nazi Germany or the
Soviet Union under Stalin. If it is perhaps not a question for
debate that Northern American scientists found vastly better
conditions (which not only include economic resources) than
many of their counterparts in Europe, the top-down, God’s eye
view on academia and the broader social system has turned out to
be problematic for the more empirically minded researchers of
science as a social practice. Once real scientiﬁc practices can no
longer be subsumed under such large umbrella concepts, the
epistemological authority of the sociological observer starts to be
challenged by other experts and scientiﬁc practices need closer
empirical scrutiny.
In this context, the Strong Programme articulated a set of
theoretical ideas that crucially contributed to the emergence of
Science and Technology Studies (STS). The Strong Programme
has been associated especially with the qualitative, constructivist,
microsociological strands, such as the Laboratory Studies (Latour
and Woolgar, 1979; Knorr Cetina, 1981), the sociology of scien-
tiﬁc knowledge (Hicks and Potter, 1991) and academic discourse
analysis (Myers, 1985).4
What are the general tendencies in the research that has been
developing in the wake of the Strong Programme? Firstly, Strong
Programme research typically focuses on material practices,
which cannot be explained by intentional actors or determining
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structures (cf. van Eeden, 2017). Secondly, it prefers empirical
case studies of complex arrangements of speciﬁcally interlaced
practices and processes. Thirdly, it considers truth and reality as
the non-necessary result of dynamics among heterogeneous
elements.
Discourse Studies and Science and Technology Studies do not
necessarily deal with the same objects and challenges: one does
not ‘use’ language in the same way as one ‘uses’ a technology.
While Bloor made the radical claim that even mathematics should
be accounted for symmetrically (i.e., socially), most discourse
research deals whose profoundly social nature nobody would
contest. And presenting a research programme for the ﬁeld of
STS, which did not exist at the time, is different from taking
lessons for Discourse Studies, which has been developing for
decades.
Therefore, I have adapted the Strong Programme from STS to
the special circumstances of Discourse Studies today. From STS, it
takes the fundamental idea that true and wrong ideas are con-
stituted in ways that are not fundamentally different, i.e., in
discursive practices. While ‘weak’ strands have recourse to dis-
course analytical explanations which can only account for ‘false’
representations of social reality, the strong programme investi-
gates ‘true’ and ‘false’ ideas through the same set of methodolo-
gical and theoretical tools of social research. Its ﬁrst and major
principle therefore is symmetry of explanation, applying the same
logic of explanation to true and false representations of the social.
The other three principles are:
1. Heterogeneity of factors. The Strong Programme recognizes
the heterogeneous factors - discursive, non-discursive but
also non-discursive non-social ones - that are mobilised in
the construction of reality (cf. for a linguistic perspective on
heterogeneity, see Maingueneau, 2017). It does not subscribe
to the idea that the social is nothing but a product of
linguistic practices. Nor does it believe that truth reﬂects one
underlying power structure. It ﬁrmly places discursive
practices in the material lives of discourse participants, who
mobilise social, linguistic and physical resources to produce
meanings, structures and truths.
2. Multi-perspectivality. It abstains from a God’s eye view on
the social, which privileges one reality over all others. Rather
than deciding on what is the one true perspective on the
social, it takes stock of the various, competing truths and
realities and ask how they are constructed. While there is no
epistemological primacy of one perspective over the other,
the Strong Programme recognizes that not all ideas are equal
and the question is how their truth value can be accounted
for through the situated discursive and non-discursive
practices that constitute them (Haraway, 1988).
3. Critical reﬂexivity. It invites discourse researchers to consider
their activity as being part of the discursive objects they
study. As a discourse about discourses in discourse, it
acknowledges the critical effects scientiﬁc discourse may have
on non-scientiﬁc practices (cf. Zienkowski, 2017). Scientiﬁc
discourse cannot be neutral; it is always political because it is
tied up in struggles over truth within academic communities,
as well as in the broader social space (Celikates, 2018;
Herzog, 2016). Discourse researchers, therefore, should
reﬂect on their own role in social struggles over truth (cf.
Nonhoff, 2017; Parker, 2015).
Conclusion: for a strong epistemology and a strong politics
The Strong Programme invites discourse researchers to deal with
truths as a real-world problem. Whenever people use language,
they enter struggles over truth. And in many cases one needs to
deal with contradictory truth claims of ﬁrst-order participants
and of second-order discourse researchers. While discourse
researchers cannot claim a privileged position that allows them to
reveal a Truth that is hidden to others, there is no reason why
they should not defend the ideas that they think are true, valuable
and coherent against those ideas that are of lesser value to them.
The Strong Programme invites discourse research to critically
interrogate the struggles over truth in the light of the practice turn
that has taken place in the social sciences (Schatzki et al., 2001;
Boltanski, 1990). Rather than taking scientiﬁc truth claims as
something categorically different from the truth claims of non-
scientiﬁc language users, the practice view of discourse looks into
the processes through which truths are constructed over time in a
discourse community. By following the practice turn, the Strong
Programme critically interrogates two major strands in the social
sciences: a) the structuralist heritage, which one can ﬁnd espe-
cially in classical strands of discourse research and which per-
ceives the social as a reality which is before and outside language
as it were, b) actor-centred approaches in sociology, which take
meaning as a product of intentional and strategic language users.
The Strong Programme defends a third position which con-
siders socially established truths as an effect of discursive prac-
tices. While it recognizes that not all ideas have the same truth
value, it favours symmetrical accounts of the truth claims of
discourse participants and those of discourse observers. The
Strong Programme does not make discourse researcher to choose
between universalism and culturalism, realism and relativism.
Rather, it outlines principles for how to make truth claims in
academic discourse with respect to the truths and realities con-
structed and established by other language users in their discourse
communities. While Strong Programmers refrain from adjudi-
cating on the truth, untruth or post-truth of any particular claim,
they investigate the practices and processes that make some
claims more true and valuable than others.
What are then the political implications and consequences for
discourse research following the Strong Programme? Embracing a
constructivist orientation does not lead to a normative anything
goes and moral relativism. There is no reason why discourse
researchers should think that the denial of climate change or the
holocaust is just as acceptable as any other claim. The Strong
Programme certainly does not make the case for ‘fake news’ or
‘alternative facts’. On the contrary, it perceives the social world as
a world of people and things, bodies and ideas which do not have
the same value.
While neither populists nor intellectuals can claim access to
Truth, the type of truths political propagandists and specialised
experts produce are of a different order and quality. Promoted by
billionaires from the oil industry, the idea that there is no climate
change does not have the same normative quality as the ideas that
a community of specialised climate researchers have produced
through scientiﬁc procedures. Specialists produce truth claims
through intimate knowledge of their objects in discourse com-
munities which have developed trusted expertise. They may also
have certain quality standards that are applied to distinguish
between more and less valued knowledges. Highly valued ideas
usually emerge from valuation practices and discursive dynamics
over which individual language users usually have little inten-
tional control. Why should specialists accept that the ideas valued
in trusted expert communities are subordinate to the truths of
non-specialists whose claims may be just personal whims? Not all
knowledges have the same truth value.
Strong Programmers know that there is no Reality and Truth
that can be accounted for by Reason. While they accept the
plurality of truths and conﬂicting value hierarchies within and
between discourse communities, they also know that truths are
precious things that need time and labour, resources and practical
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know-how. Just like other language users, they are tied up in
struggles over what counts as true and real in academic or non-
academic communities. These are struggles where discourse
theorists can claim no special position unless they enter the very
games they deal with and intervene in them practically. No matter
whether truth claims are made by discourse participants or
professional discourse analysts, the value of their ideas needs to
be realised through the real effects their practices have on the
social world. And this is an insight that one can perhaps take
from the ﬁrst critical theorist of discourse: “Man must prove the
truth, i.e., the reality and power, the this-sidedness (Diesseitigkeit)
of his thinking, in practice… Philosophers have hitherto only
interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.”
(Marx, 1969).
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Notes
1 Whereas many North American researchers tend to conceptualise discourse as a
symbolically mediated turn-taking process in a face-to-face situation, British discourse
analysts show more awareness of wider societal constraints on language use such as
class and capitalism. Unlike North American interactionists, who tend to focus on the
negotiation of social order in face-to-face interactions, British discourse researchers are
more interested in the articulation of discourse and class struggle.
2 And there are many other strands in Discourse Studies (Angermuller, 2015) that have
dealt with the question of truth in discourse (one example is argumentation, van
Eemeren, 2004; Amossy, 2005; another example are interactional approaches to
discourse, e.g., Potter, 1996).
3 Another Strong Programme was formulated by Jeffrey Alexander and Philip Smith in
cultural sociology (2010). By putting meaning centre stage, Alexander/Smith make the
case for what could be called a discursive turn in social theory. While they do not
speciﬁcally deal with the question of truth and reality, their framework gives a place to
all socially and politically oriented discourse researchers no matter whether they are
‘strong’ and ‘weak’.
4 An in-depth discussion would reveal that Bloor and Latour, who originated Actor-
Network-Theory, always insisted on their differences. While Bloor castigates Latour
for establishing an asymmetric vantage point above nature and society as it were
(Bloor, 1999, p 85), Latour sees Bloor as being “too social” and as reproducing the
“modernist” asymmetry between nature and society (Latour, 1999, p 127).
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